International Journal of Communication 17(2023), 3250–3266 1932–8036/20230005

# Between the Homefront and Battleground, Between TV and Smartphone: Evaluating the Use of a Second Screen in the May 2021 Israel-Palestine Crisis

VERED ELISHAR-MALKA
YARON ARIEL
DANA WEIMANN-SAKS
The Max Stern Yezreel Valley College, Israel

Second-screen use has attracted significant scholarly attention over the last decade. Although media usage is important during crises, no study has examined second screening in times of violent conflict, when civilians are directly affected. This study examines the role of second-screen usage in Israeli citizens' lives during the May 2021 Israel-Palestine crisis. It focuses on correlations between users' level of concern, their immediate degree of threat (based on their proximity to the warzone), and their usage of a second, new media screen, in addition to televisions. Results indicate that the higher the threat level users faced, the more frequently they used second screens. Furthermore, the intensity of second screening rose with the degree of threat and their accompanying level of concern and cognitive needs. The findings advance our understanding of media's wartime role from the perspective of civilians under threat, indicating that as technology enables people to remain constantly connected and not limit themselves to a single platform, they are likely to take advantage of a wide range of communication options.

*Keywords: second screen, new media, cognitive needs, war, civilians under threat, Israel*

In May 2021, Israel and Gaza engaged in a 12-day military conflict, which unfolded in parallel to ethnic clashes in Jerusalem and other mixed Jewish-Arab cities in Israel. This conflict—referred to as Operation Guardian of the Walls and Sword of Jerusalem Battle by Israel and Hamas, respectively—was similar to previous violent confrontations in that conflict-ridden area in that it involved thousands of rockets fired on Israeli cities and towns, air attacks on Gaza, as well as casualties and harm to civilians on both sides.

The media's role in wars and other violent conflicts has long been the focus of research attention (Althaus, 2003; Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2007; Blondheim & Shifman, 2009; Kalb & Saivetz, 2007; Liebes & Kampf, 2009; Nohrstedt, Kaitatzi-Whitlock, Ottosen, & Riegert, 2000; Tenenboim, 2017; Yarchi, 2016). More recently, especially in the last two decades, studies have begun examining the role that new media, particularly social media, play under these circumstances (Bennett, 2013; Evans, 2016; Knüpfer &

Vered Elishar-Malka: veredm@yvc.ac.il
Yaron Ariel: yarona@yvc.ac.il
Dana Weimann-Saks: danawe@yvc.ac.il
Date submitted: 2022-04-19

Copyright © 2023 (Vered Elishar-Malka, Yaron Ariel, and Dana Weimann-Saks). Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives (by-nc-nd). Available at http://ijoc.org.

Entman, 2018; Livio & Cohen-Yechezkely, 2019; Melki & Kozman, 2021; Merrin & Hoskins, 2020; Schafer, Truc, Badouard, Castex, & Musiani, 2019; Wolfsfeld, 2018).

Specifically, second-screen use—the use of smartphones and other mobile devices while watching television—has recently attracted considerable attention, with scholars examining usage patterns, gratifications, and related professional, socioeconomic, and political aspects. Most studies have focused on live political and sports broadcasts (Gil de Zúñiga, Garcia-Perdomo, & McGregor, 2015; Gil de Zúñiga & Liu, 2017; Guo, 2020; Kim & Kim, 2020; Marín-Montín, 2020; Segijn, Voorveld, Vandeberg, & Smit, 2017; Weimann-Saks, Ariel, & Elishar-Malka, 2019). However, despite the consensus that media usage is a meaningful aspect of every crisis, at both the individual and national levels, and although second screening, in particular, is a major phenomenon, to the best of our knowledge, no study has examined this usage in times of violent conflict, especially when civilians are directly targeted.

## Wartime Media

The media's role in our lives is particularly pronounced during extreme emergencies, such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and wars (Katz & Liebes, 2007; Liebes, 1998; Wolfsfeld & Weimann, 1997). Under such circumstances, both the scope and level of the media-government-public interactions are disproportionate. This disproportionality is intensified when this tripartite relationship is expanded by the addition of other players, such as the military, and when the crisis is particularly adverse (Baden & Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2018; Bennett et al., 2007; Yarchi, 2016).

Studies on the wartime role of various media have addressed a variety of issues, including the characteristics of coverage and the representation patterns of the players involved (Kalb & Saivetz, 2007; Liebes & Kampf, 2009; Nohrstedt et al., 2000; White, 2020); the way coverage affects decision makers and national and international public opinion (Hammond, 2018; Miller & Bokemper, 2016; Sobel, Kim, & Riffe, 2020; Wolfsfeld, 2004); and institutional aspects, such as government-military-media interrelations and the way governments and other political players enlist the media to further their aims (Bennett et al., 2007; Blondheim & Shifman, 2009; Livio & Cohen-Yechezkely, 2019; Yarchi, 2016). Finally, another productive field of research, addressed only indirectly in this study, examines various aspects of war journalism, including professional dilemmas and challenges (Livio & Cohen-Yechezkely, 2019; Stuart & Zelizer, 2004) and the influence of the evolving media landscape on journalist work (Althaus, 2003; Liebes, 1997; Neiger, Zandberg, & Meyers, 2010; Tenenboim, 2017).

## Crisis and New Media

The emergence of new media has evoked broad scholarly interest in their coverage of armed conflicts and other crises (Bennett, 2013; Evans, 2016; Knüpfer & Entman, 2018; Melki & Kozman, 2021; Merrin & Hoskins, 2020; Wolfsfeld, 2018). There is a scholarly consensus that given new media's unique features, the balance of power in political communication must be reassessed to consider the potential damage and benefit they entail for other players in the field (Lev-On, 2012, 2018; Livio & Cohen-Yechezkely, 2019; Weimann, 2006).

Lev-On (2010) and Naveh (2008) described the extensive activity in a broad range of online platforms during the 2006 Second Lebanon War. This activity included local and private initiatives to disseminate up-to-date information on websites, forums, and dedicated blogs using e-mail and social media, civilian volunteer recruitment ventures, humorous and satirical messages, updates on the welfare of relatives, and criticism of decision makers. New media also provided opportunities to express support for the military and government. Thus, Israelis turned to diverse uses of new media to fill what was seen as a void left by the authorities' impaired wartime functioning, particularly in matters related to the home front (Lev-On, 2010; Naveh, 2008).

In the United States, Bracken, Jeffres, Neuendorf, Kopfman, and Moulla (2005) highlighted the importance of smartphones in times of crisis, contending, for example, that smartphone-based interpersonal communication networks, combined with television, constituted the primary source of information during 9/11. Likewise, Katz and Rice (2002) proposed that smartphone use was effective during those events because it enabled the immediate transfer of information and helped family and close friends. Other studies focused on natural disasters, such as the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 (Macias, Hilyard, & Freimuth, 2009) and the 2005 Hurricane Katrina (Procopio & Procopio, 2007), during which new media also became highly effective tools in managing the crises, serving authorities, citizens, and small organizations.

## Individual Media Usage Under Threat

Multiple studies on the media's role in wartime, as well as during other crises, have focused on the perspective of individuals under threat (Frey, 2018; Huang, Lei, Xu, Liu, & Yu, 2020; Lev-On, 2010; Malka, Ariel, & Avidar, 2015; Naveh, 2008; Schejter & Cohen, 2013; Singh, Cumberland, Ugarte, Bruckner, & Young, 2020). In addition, various communication theories help elucidate the correlations among individuals' reactions to threatening situations, cognitive needs in such situations, and media use patterns. In wartime, cognitive needs may be at their peak, as up-to-date information and knowledge become urgently relevant to people close to the event. This notion resonates with the *uses and gratifications theory*, an efficient, user-centered framework for examining users' interactions with and within media (Katz, Blumler, & Gurevitch, 1974; Rubin, 2002; Ruggiero, 2000). According to the theory, audiences or users of various media-related activities are mediated in that they depend on the active selection and usage of different media choices. Therefore, efforts are made to identify the cognitive and affective needs that shape individual media expectations (Katz et al., 1974). From a more current perspective, the theory is used to examine the primary needs of prospective audiences that are met by new media (Gan & Li, 2018; Rafaeli & Ariel, 2008; Rathnayake & Winter, 2018).

Studies applying the uses and gratifications approach have explored the general uses of smartphones (Joo & Sang, 2013) as well as specific ones such as smartphone-enabled social networking by adolescents (Gan & Li, 2018; Sanz-Blas, Ruiz-Mafé, Marti-Parreño, & Hernández-Fernández, 2013). Sundar and Limperos (2013) appraised smartphones as examples of the challenges arising when applying the current uses and gratifications theory, including theoretical and empirical questions concerning the smartphone's definition as a medium, content, processes, and affordability.

Informed by the uses and gratifications theory, Malka and colleagues (2015) examined WhatsApp use by Israeli civilians during the 2014 Gaza War, another military conflict that involved direct targeting of

civilians, heavy casualties, and severe damages. They found that the application—extremely popular in Israel—was used in several unexpected ways, including as a news source, thereby gratifying Israelis' growing cognitive needs during the conflict. Malka and colleagues (2015) also noted a significant correlation between civilians' proximity to the conflict area in and around Gaza (threat level) and the intensity of diverse WhatsApp uses for multiple gratifications—a finding that may be explained in terms of civilians' reaction to their heightened levels of threat and concern.

Kozman and Melki (2018) studied media uses and gratifications among Syrian nationals displaced during the civil war, showing how the Internet and social media played a significant role in these people's lives, especially in meeting their need to remain informed. Finally, Schejter and Cohen (2013) evaluated Israelis' use of smartphones during the 2006 Second Lebanon War and the 2008–2009 Gaza War ("Operation Cast Lead"), finding that during these periods, smartphone usage increased because of their most fundamental characteristic—portability—which rendered them constantly and consistently available.

Another perspective that may help explain how people use media in times of war and crisis is the *media dependency theory*. According to Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976), media dependency is "the dependency of audiences on media information sources—a dependency that leads to modifications in personal and social processes" (p. 5). Thus, under conditions of ambiguity, such as in the course of a natural disaster or violent conflict, mass media become the undisputed source of public information. However, significant changes in media production resources and consumption suggest the need to reassess the theory, applying it beyond traditional media outlets to our current multichannel, multi-platform digital environment. Theoretically, in this new context, everyone can access multiple sources of information anytime, anywhere. Empirically, Lowrey (2004) found a strong effect of external threat on the degree of media dependence, claiming that for most civilians, the sense of threat was a stronger predictor of media dependency than were education, income, or community ties.

Like the uses and gratifications approach, the media dependency theory has been assessed in the context of the Internet and the social media era and found to be highly relevant (Kim & Jung, 2017; Li & Lin, 2016; Lyu, 2019; Maxian, 2014; Riffe, Lacy, & Varouhakis, 2008). Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, no study has examined the media usage of a second screen under threat. Media dependency theory implies that an increase in people's exposure to threat will increase their media dependency on both the micro and macro levels (Ball-Rokeach, 1985; Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976; Loges, 1994; Lyu, 2019). In such situations, people will tend to make greater efforts to access reliable, up-to-date sources of information about the threat they are facing. Consequently, it can be valuable to study second screening by those facing immediate, large-scale threats.

## Second-Screen Usage

Gil de Zúñiga and colleagues (2015) defined the second-screen phenomenon as the use of an electronic device or screen to obtain more information or to participate in real-time discussion while simultaneously watching television or a broadcast or accessing the Internet or social networking sites. Keinonen and Shagrir (2017) noted that the immediateness of a television program could be enhanced by using digital platforms and social networks, which function as a second screen. Similarly, Hayat, Lesser, and Samuel-Azran (2017) argued that second-screen usage involved looking up information and interacting with

others by logging onto social networking sites. Finally, Marín-Montín (2020) found that social networking sites were a vital element of second-screen usage related to television consumption.

Blake (2016) defined the second-screen experience as engaging with related media content on two screens simultaneously. In a study by Segijn and colleagues (2017), 60% of the participants indicated having simultaneously used multiple screens at least once, with the TV-smartphone combination being the most prevalent. Guo (2020) suggested that second-screen usage provided audiences with more opportunities to engage with branded television content, thus strengthening the relationship between the two media and potentially extending it to media figures and other audience members.

Kim and Kim (2020) found that the use of social live-streaming services could be linked to psychological factors such as social well-being and loneliness. Second screening could thus be considered a form of media multitasking. In examining the reciprocal relationship between media multitasking patterns and viewers' needs and gratifications, Wang and Tchernev (2012) found that viewers' emotional needs and media multitasking determined their level of emotional gratification. Multitasking increased emotional gratification when emotional needs were low and vice versa. As demonstrated by Park, Xu, Rourke, and Bellur (2019), tweeting while watching TV reduced viewers' sense of transportation, or integrative mingling of attention, feelings, and imagery, negatively affecting their overall enjoyment of the program. Conversely, second-screen usage during a live broadcast made it possible for viewers to interact even when they were unable to attend the event together in the same physical space (Weimann-Saks et al., 2019). Finally, Gil de Zúñiga and Liu (2017) found that using second screens while viewing political events increased engagement. These studies suggest that the motivation for second screening under such circumstances is twofold: Searching for relevant information and taking part in discussions about the current broadcast.

## The Current Study

This study examines the role played by second-screen usage in the lives of Israeli citizens during the tense May 2021 events. Particular attention is given to correlations between users' levels of concern due to the conflict and the degree of threat, operationalized as relative proximity to the warzone and possible danger, and their second-screening patterns.

Based on these research objectives and drawing on the literature reviewed above, our hypotheses are as follows:

*H1a: There is a positive correlation between threat level and intensity of second screening.*

*H1b: There is a positive correlation between concern level and intensity of second screening.*

*H1c: There is a positive correlation between users' cognitive needs and intensity of second screening.*

*H2: Cognitive needs and concerns mediate the correlation between threat level and intensity of second screening.*

## Methods

### *Participants and Procedure*

Data for this study were gathered from 411 participants (%51 women), ranging in age from 18 to 74 years ($M$ = 42.96, $SD$ = 15.75). All participants were native Hebrew speakers; most were nonreligious (71.5%) and married (56.2%). We obtained the sample from an online panel representing the distribution of the Jewish-Israeli population based on figures provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics (2019). The sample size was estimated using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), based on a medium-sized effect, which demonstrated a 90% power to detect significant differences. The participants were asked to complete a short, anonymous survey that included demographic questions (response time ≈ 10 minutes).

### *Measured Variables*

*Independent Variable: Threat Level*

During the war, thousands of rockets were fired from Gaza toward Israel, falling in different areas of the country. Most rockets fell in the southern part of the state, the closest area to its border with Gaza. In general, the farther north civilians lived, the smaller were their chances of being exposed to rockets (National Emergency Portal, 2021). Accordingly, we created a scale with three levels of threat, operationalized by the distance of the participants' residential area and possible danger: (1) far from the warzone without any real danger; (2) secondary danger area with some possibility of danger; and (3) proximity to the danger zone with real danger.

*Mediators*

Cognitive needs were assessed using a three-item scale (α = .83), rated from 1 ("very much") to 5 ("not at all"). The items included statements relating to the contribution of information consumption to fulfilling a cognitive need, based on Malka and colleagues (2015; e.g., "Consuming information helps me better understand the events").

Concern was assessed using a three-item scale (α = .65) rated from 1 ("very much") to 5 ("not at all"). The items included statements relating to the concern evoked by the security situation (e.g., "I am worried about friends/relatives in the security threat zone"). Two items were omitted due to low internal reliability.

*Dependent Variable: Second-Screen Use*

To assess second-screen use, we used a three-item scale (α = .97) rated from 1 ("several times an hour or more") to 7 ("not at all"). The items included statements relating to the extent the participants used their smartphone while watching TV, based on Weimann-Saks and colleagues' (2019) questionnaire, with minor adaptations to the context of a military operation (e.g., "I use a smartphone while watching TV to be updated on security events simultaneously on both platforms").

## Results

To examine news consumption habits, we asked participants how often they used various media platforms to obtain updates on events related to the military conflict. Regarding new media,[1] participants reported receiving updates at least once each day via news websites (74%), WhatsApp (51%), Facebook (46%), applications designed for security updates on smartphones (34%), and Twitter (15%). Regarding traditional media, 67% reported that they tended to stay updated via TV news broadcasts and 41% via the radio, both at least once each day (Figure 1).




***Figure 1. Source of news consumption habits by platform.***

Overall, the level of concern decreased depending on the level of threat, with no significant differences across the mean levels of concern. The highest level of concern was in the southern part of the country, where many rockets fell every day ($M$ = 3.72, $SD$ = .79), followed by Tel Aviv, where several rockets fell daily ($M$ = 3.69, $SD$ = .77). The lowest level was in Jerusalem, which, with the exception of the first day of conflict, was not a danger zone in terms of rocket firing from Gaza ($M$ = 3.57, $SD$ = .79). Unexpectedly, a slight increase in the level of concern ($M$ = 3.61, $SD$ = .97) was noted in northern Israel, which, although generally considered an area of threat, was not a front in this conflict, and no rockets fell there during the May events.

To evaluate H1a, we computed Spearman correlations between threat level and second-screen use. As expected, a significant positive correlation was found ($r$ =.21, $p$ < .001). To evaluate H1b and H1c, we computed Pearson correlations among the research variables. Again, as expected, a significant positive correlation was found ($r$ = .22, $p$ < .001) between concern and second-screen use (H1b). A positive correlation ($r$ = .24, $p$ < .001) was also found between cognitive needs and second-screen use (Table 1).

[1] The distribution of social media usage during the war resembles data provided by the Israel Internet Association regarding routine usage patterns (see Israel Internet Association, 2021).

***Table 1. Correlations Between Research Variables (n = 411).***

| Variable | Cognitive Needs | Concern | Second-Screen Use |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actual threat level | .12* | .06 | .21** |
| Cognitive needs | | .16** | .24** |
| Concern | | | .22** |

*Note. *p < .05, **p < .001*

To examine the mediating role of cognitive needs and concern in the relation between threat levels and second-screen use (H2), we used Hayes' (2018) PROCESS bootstrapping command with 5,000 iterations (Model 4). The analysis treated threat level as the predictor variable, cognitive needs and concern level as mediators, and second-screen usage as the dependent variable. The 95% confidence interval (CI) for the direct effect of threat level on second-screen usage did not include 0 (95% CI [.196, .598]) with 5,000 resamples, $F$ (3, 401) = 18.36, $p$ < .001. The indirect effects of threat level on second-screen usage through (a) cognitive needs did not include 0 (95% CI [.049, .062]); and through (b) concern did include 0 (95% CI [−.015, .068]) with 5,000 resamples. In other words, the model indicated only an indirect effect of threat level on second-screen usage through cognitive needs and no effect through concern (Figure 2).




***Figure 2. The mediation model between actual threat level and second-screen usage through cognitive needs and concern.***

*$p$ < .001

## Discussion

Violent conflicts have always caused human suffering. Wars that directly involve civilians, turning the home front into warzones, are the most egregious in this regard. Using media during such events as a means to meet their unique needs is one way in which civilians cope with these intolerable situations (Kozman & Melki, 2018; Lev-On, 2010; Malka et al., 2015; Naveh, 2008).

The current study examined the usage patterns of second screens by Israeli civilians during the 12-day Israel-Palestine crisis in May 2021. The study aimed to understand what conditions led to increased second-screen usage. It investigated the potential effects of cognitive needs, concern level, and degree of threat (relative proximity to the fighting areas and the locations subject to rocket attacks) on civilians' usage of second screens.

Hypothesis 1, which predicted a positive correlation between threat level and the amount of second-screen use, was confirmed. That is, the higher the threat faced by media users, the more frequently they used their second screens throughout the violent May events. Hypotheses 2 and 3—regarding the correlation between users' concern levels and cognitive needs and the amount of second-screen usage—were also confirmed, with the intensity of users' second-screen usage rising as their level of concern and their cognitive needs increased. That is, during the operation, people tended to make more intense use of second screens to respond to their situationally driven needs.

Hypothesis 4 concerned mediated correlations between threat levels and second-screen usage. Specifically, we assumed that users' cognitive needs and concerns would mediate their threat level and second screening patterns. However, our findings indicated that an indirect effect of threat level on second-screen usage was related only to cognitive needs, not to concern. That is, as the degree of threat increased, users' cognitive needs increased as well, as did their second-screen usage. At the same time, although users' concern level was directly correlated with second screening, it did not mediate between threat level and second-screen usage.

This finding is noteworthy in indicating that people's motivations for adding second screens to their media consumption habits under wartime circumstances are not purely cognitive. One explanation for this may be that threat level and the subjective feeling of concern are not necessarily aligned. For example, some people may feel concerned although they are in a relatively safe zone, while others might not feel concerned even if they experience life under fire. Still others may lie about such feelings, finding it inappropriate or undesirable to admit their unease. Further research should examine these thought-provoking relationships between threat level and concern as reported by the study's participants.

The current study's findings also suggest how meaningful the use of second screens was for the Israeli population during a war that directly threatened their lives and the safety and well-being of their loved ones. As the negative emotions associated with such a challenging situation became stronger, and as users' threat levels grew, second screening intensified. In other words, as people faced missiles launched at their homes, the homes of their loved ones, or any other target that made them concerned, so did the scale of media dependency increase, leading to intensified use of two screens.

A similar trend is revealed regarding users' cognitive needs. As the literature has shown, people's cognitive needs increase during times of crisis, followed by a rise in their search for relevant information (Malka et al., 2015). According to the current study, people's search for information is not limited to their routine media consumption habits but spreads to the realm of second screens.

### *Study Limitations and Future Studies*

As with other research that focuses on one particular case study, "the generalizability of conclusions" based on our research is limited. Future research could address this limitation by using multiple data sources or longitudinal designs and considering a wider range of factors that may impact second-screen usage in times of crisis (war, terrorist attacks, or natural disasters) in different situations and countries. In this study, we focused on the way and extent to which civilians' concern level affected their second-screen usage during the May 2021

events. Future research should investigate the role of related emotions, such as fear and anxiety, in this context, and compare the media responses of people of different cultures in similar crises.

Another limitation of this study is the reliance on self-reported data, which may be subject to biases such as social desirability or memory distortions. It is possible that people's willingness to admit the very existence of such emotions may be affected by their perceived legitimacy during times of national crisis, as compared with routine times. To address this issue, future research in this field could use objective methods to measure concern, fear, and anxiety in addition to or instead of relying on participants' self-reported levels of the same.

The uses and gratifications theory combined with the media dependency theory may offer interrelated explanations for media behavior in times of war. Nevertheless, since both theories were initially used to consider mass media and audiences' interactions with a relatively small number of media outlets, this research offers new insights. In the case of second screening, the user is the sole party responsible for media-related activities, gratifications, and dependencies; thus, it is essential to understand the behavior and perceptions of various audiences and users in such times. In this way, the current study helps us understand the role of the media during wartime from the point of view of civilians in danger. Furthermore, it shows that technology makes it possible for people to stay updated on current events without being limited to a single platform and that people are likely to use all the options they have.

## References

Althaus, Scott L. (2003). When news norms collide, follow the lead: New evidence for press independence. *Political Communication, 20(*4), 381–414. doi:10.1080/10584600390244158

Baden, C., & Tenenboim-Weinblatt, K. (2018). The search for common ground in conflict news research: Comparing the coverage of six current conflicts in domestic and international media over time. *Media, War & Conflict, 11*(1), 22–45. doi:10.1177%2F1750635217702071

Ball-Rokeach, S. J. (1985). The origins of individual media-system dependency: A sociological framework. *Communication Research, 12*(4), 485–510. doi:10.1177%2F009365085012004003

Ball-Rokeach, S. J., & DeFleur, M. L. (1976). A dependency model of mass-media effects. *Communication Research, 3*(1), 3–21. doi:10.1177%2F009365027600300101

Bennett, D. (2013). Exploring the impact of an evolving war and terror blogosphere on traditional media coverage of conflict. *Media, War & Conflict, 6*(1), 37–53. doi:10.1177%2F1750635212469907

Bennett, W. L., Lawrence, R. G., & Livingston, S. (2007). *When the press fails*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Blake, J. (2016). *Television and the second screen: Interactive TV in the age of social participation.* Oxford, NY: Routledge.

Blondheim, M., & Shifman, L. (2009). What officials say, what media show and what publics get: Gaza, January 2009. *Communication Review, 12*(3), 205–214. doi:10.1080/10714420903124036

Bracken, C. C., Jeffres, L. W., Neuendorf, K. A., Kopfman, J., & Moulla, F. (2005). How cosmopolites react to messages: America under attack. *Communication Research Reports, 22*(1), 47–58. doi:10.1080/0882409052000343516

Central Bureau of Statistics. (2019). *Statistical abstract of Israel 2019—No. 70*. Retrieved from https://www.cbs.gov.il/en/publications/Pages/2019/Statistical-Abstract-of-Israel-2019-No-70.aspx

Evans, M. (2016). Information dissemination in new media: YouTube and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. *Media, War & Conflict, 9*(3), 325–343. doi:10.1177%2F1750635216643113

Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A. G. (2009). Statistical power analyses using G* Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. *Behavior Research Methods, 41*(4), 1149–1160. doi:10.3758/BRM.41.4.1149

Frey, E. (2018). Victims' use of social media during and after the Utøya terror attack: Fear, resilience, sorrow and solidarity. In H. Hornmoen (Ed.), *Social media use in crisis and risk communication* (pp. 43–62). Bingley, UK: Emerald Publishing Limited. doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-269-120181007

Gan, C., & Li, H. (2018). Understanding the effects of gratifications on the continuance intention to use WeChat in China: A perspective on uses and gratifications. *Computers in Human Behavior, 78*, 306–315. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2017.10.003

Gil de Zúñiga, H., Garcia-Perdomo, V., & McGregor, S. C. (2015). What is second screening? Exploring motivations of second screen use and its effect on online political participation. *Journal of Communication, 65*(5), 793–815. doi:10.1111/jcom.12174

Gil de Zúñiga, H., & Liu, J. H. (2017). Second screening politics in the social media sphere: Advancing research on dual screen use in political communication with evidence from 20 countries. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 61*(2), 193–219. doi:10.1080/08838151.2017.1309420

Guo, M. (2020). Second screening: Measuring second screen user behavior in a social television viewing environment. *International Journal on Media Management, 22*(2), 97–116. doi:10.1080/14241277.2020.1803326

Hammond, P. (2018). When frames collide: "Ethnic war" and "genocide." *Media, War & Conflict, 11*(4), 434–445. doi:10.1177%2F1750635218776994

Hayat, T. Z., Lesser, O., & Samuel-Azran, T. (2017). Gendered discourse patterns on online social networks: A social network analysis perspective. *Computers in Human Behavior, 77*, 132–139. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2017.08.041

Hayes, A. F. (2018). Partial, conditional, and moderated moderated mediation: Quantification, inference, and interpretation. *Communication Monographs, 85*(1), 4–40. https://doi.org/10.1080/03637751.2017.1352100

Huang, L., Lei, W., Xu, F., Liu, H., & Yu, L. (2020). Emotional responses and coping strategies in nurses and nursing students during Covid-19 outbreak: A comparative study. *PLoSOne, 15*(8). doi:10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0237303

Israel Internet Association. (2021). *Data on social media and online platform use in Israel (2021).* Retrieved from https://en.isoc.org.il/data-and-statistics/data-on-social-media-and-online-platform-use-in-israel-2021

Joo, J., & Sang, Y. (2013). Exploring Koreans' smartphone usage: An integrated model of the technology acceptance model and uses and gratifications theory. *Computers in Human Behavior, 29*(6), 2512–2518. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2013.06.002

Kalb, M., & Saivetz, C. (2007). The Israeli–Hezbollah war of 2006: The media as a weapon in asymmetrical conflict. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 12*(3), 43–66. doi:10.1177%2F1081180X07303934

Katz, E., Blumler, J. G., & Gurevitch, M. (1974). Utilization of mass communication by the individual. In J. G. Blumler & E. Katz (Eds.), *The uses of mass communications: Current perspectives on gratifications research* (pp. 19–32). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Katz, E., & Liebes. T. (2007). "No more peace!": How disaster, terror and war have upstaged media events*. International Journal of Communication, 1*, 157–166.

Katz, J. E., & Rice, R. E. (2002). The telephone as a medium of faith, hope, terror, and redemption: America, September 11. *Prometheus, 20*(3), 247–253. doi:10.1080/08109020210144882

Keinonen, H., & Shagrir, O. K. (2017). From public service broadcasting to soci(et)al TV. *Nordicom Review, 38*(1), 65–79. doi:10.1515/nor-2016-0037

Kim, H. S., & Kim, M. (2020). Viewing sports online together? Psychological consequences on social live streaming service usage. *Sport Management Review, 23*(5), 869–882. doi:10.1016/j.smr.2019.12.007

Kim, Y.-C., & Jung. J.-Y. (2017). SNS dependency and interpersonal storytelling: An extension of media system dependency theory. *New Media & Society, 19*(9), 1458–1475. doi:10.1177%2F1461444816636611

Knüpfer, C. B., & Entman, R. M. (2018). Framing conflicts in digital and transnational media environments. *Media, War & Conflict, 11*(4), 476–488. doi:10.1177%2F1750635218796381

Kozman, C., & Melki, J. (2018). News media uses during war the case of the Syrian conflict. *Journalism Studies, 19*(10), 1466–1488. doi:10.1080/1461670X.2017.1279564

Lev-On, A. (2010). *Tifkuday media hadashim bishat herum: Hamikre shel milhemet Levanon hashnia* [New media uses in wartime: The case of the Second Lebanon War]. Chaim Herzog Institute for Media, Politics and Society, Tel Aviv University. Retrieved from https://www.tau.ac.il/institutes/herzog/commschool/Lebanon7.pdf

Lev-On, A. (2012). Communication, community, crisis: Mapping uses and gratifications in the contemporary media environment. *New Media & Society, 14*(1), 98–116. doi:10.1177%2F1461444811410401

Lev-On, A. (2018). The anti-social network? Framing social media in wartime. *Social Media & Society, 4*(3), 1–12. doi:10.1177%2F2056305118800311

Li, L., & Lin, T. T. C. (2016). Exploring work-related smartphone dependency among young working adults in China: A qualitative approach. *International Journal of Communication, 10*, 2915–2933.

Liebes, T. (1997). *Reporting the Arab-Israeli conflict: How hegemony works*. London, UK: Routledge.

Liebes, T. (1998). Television's disaster marathons: A danger to democratic processes? In T. Liebes & J. Curran (Eds.), *Media, ritual and identity* (pp. 71–85). London, UK: Routledge.

Liebes, T., & Kampf, Z. (2009). Performance journalism: The case of media's coverage of war and terror. *The Communication Review, 12*(3), 239–249. https://doi.org/10.1080/10714420903124135

Livio, O., & Cohen-Yechezkely, S. (2019). Copy, edit, paste. *Journalism Studies, 20*(5), 696–713. doi:10.1080/1461670X.2017.1417054

Loges, W. E. (1994). Canaries in the coal mine: Perceptions of threat and media system dependency relations. *Communication Research, 21*(1), 5–23. doi:10.1080/10714420903124135

Lowrey, W. (2004). Media dependency during a large-scale social disruption: The case of September 11. *Mass Communication and Society, 7*(3), 339–357. doi:10.1207/s15327825mcs0703_5

Lyu, J. C. (2019). Has the Internet won the hearts of Chinese college students? A comparative and communication medium dependency approach. *China Media Research, 15*(2), 91–101.

Macias, W., Hilyard, K., & Freimuth, V. (2009). Blog functions as risk and crisis communication during Hurricane Katrina. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 15*(1), 1–31. doi:10.1111/j.1083-6101.2009.01490.x

Malka, V., Ariel, Y., & Avidar, R. (2015). Fighting, worrying and sharing: Operation "Protective Edge" as the first WhatsApp war. *Media, War & Conflict, 8*(3), 329–344. doi:10.1177%2F1750635215611610

Marín-Montín, J. (2020). Televised sporting events: Applications of second screens. In V. Hernández-Santaolalla & M. Barrientos Bueno (Eds.), *Handbook of research on transmedia storytelling, audience engagement and business strategies* (pp. 15–29). Hershey, PA: IGI Global.

Maxian, W. (2014). Power to the people? Emotional components of media power, mobile ICTs and their potential to alter individual–media dependency relations. *Mass Communication & Society, 17*(2), 274–298. doi:10.1080/15205436.2013.830133

Melki, J., & Kozman, C. (2021). Media dependency, selective exposure and trust during war: Media sources and information needs of displaced and non-displaced Syrians. *Media, War & Conflict, 14*(1), 93–113. doi:10.1177%2F1750635219861907

Merrin, W., & Hoskins, A. (2020). Tweet fast and kill things: Digital war. *Digital War, 1*(1–3), 184–193. doi:10.1057/s42984-020-00002-1

Miller, R. A., & Bokemper, S. E. (2016). Media coverage and the escalation of militarized interstate disputes, 1992–2001. *Media, War & Conflict, 9*(2), 162–179. doi:10.1177%2F1750635216648116

National Emergency Portal. (2021). *Mediniut Hahitgonenut La Uchlusia* [Defense policy for the population]. Retrieved from https://www.oref.org.il/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/3/7463.pdf

Naveh, C. (2008). *Ha Internet kesviva le idud u le hitlakdut leumit bemahalach milchemet Levanon hashnia* [The Internet as an environment of encouragement and civilian consolidation during the Second Lebanon War]. Rothschild-Caesarea School of Communication, Tel Aviv University. Retrieved from https://www.tau.ac.il/institutes/herzog/commschool/Lebanon6.pdf

Neiger, M., Zandberg, E., & Meyers, O. (2010). Communicating critique: Toward a conceptualization of journalistic criticism. *Communication, Culture & Critique, 3*(3), 377–395. doi:10.1111/j.1753-9137.2010.01076.x

Nohrstedt, S. A., Kaitatzi-Whitlock, S., Ottosen, R., & Riegert, K. (2000). From the Persian Gulf to Kosovo—War journalism and propaganda. *European Journal of Communication, 15*(3), 383–404. doi:10.1177%2F0267323100015003007

Park, S., Xu, X., Rourke, B., & Bellur, S. (2019). Do you enjoy TV, while tweeting? Effects of multitasking on viewers' transportation, emotions, and enjoyment. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 63*(2), 231–249. doi:10.1080/08838151.2019.1622340

Procopio, C. H., & Procopio, S. T. (2007). Do you know what it means to miss New Orleans? Internet communication, geographic community and social capital in crisis. *Journal of Applied Communication Research, 35*(1), 67–87. doi:10.1080/00909880601065722

Rafaeli, S., & Ariel, Y. (2008). Online motivational factors: Incentives for participation and contribution in Wikipedia. In A. Barak (Ed.), *Psychological aspects of cyberspace: Theory, research, applications* (pp. 243–267). Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Rathnayake, C. L., & Winter, S. J. (2018). Carrying forward the uses and grats 2.0 agenda: An affordance-driven measure of social media uses and gratifications, *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 62*(3), 371–389. doi:10.1080/08838151.2018.1451861

Riffe, D., Lacy, S., & Varouhakis, M. (2008). Media system dependency theory and using the Internet for in-depth, specialized information. *Web Journal of Mass Communication Research, 11*(1), 1–14.

Rubin, A. M. (2002). Uses-and-gratifications perspective on media effects. In J. Bryant & M. B. Oliver (Eds.), *Media effects: Advances in theory and research* (pp. 181–200). New York, NY: Routledge.

Ruggiero, T. E. (2000). Uses and gratifications theory in the 21st century. *Mass Communication & Society, 3*(1), 3–37. doi:10.1207/S15327825MCS0301_02

Sanz-Blas, S., & Ruiz-Mafé, C., Marti-Parreño, J., & Hernández-Fernández, A. (2013). Assessing the influence of motivations and attitude on mobile social networking use. *Global Business Perspectives, 1*(2), 164–179. Retrieved from https://rdcu.be/cLGB1

Schafer, V., Truc, G., Badouard, R., Castex, L., & Musiani, F. (2019). Paris and Nice terrorist attacks: Exploring Twitter and web archives. *Media, War & Conflict, 12*(2), 153–170. doi:10.1177%2F1750635219839382

Schejter, A. M., & Cohen, A. A. (2013). Mobile phone usage as an indicator of solidarity: Israelis at war in 2006 and 2009. *Mobile Media & Communication, 1*(2), 174–195. doi:10.1177%2F2050157913476706

Segijn, C. M., Voorveld, H. A., Vandeberg, L., & Smit, E. G. (2017). The battle of the screens: Unraveling attention allocation and memory effects when multiscreening. *Human Communication Research, 43*(2), 295–314. doi:10.1111/hcre.12106

Singh, P., Cumberland, W. G., Ugarte, D., Bruckner, T. A., & Young, S. D. (2020). Association between generalized anxiety disorder scores and online activity among US adults during the COVID-19 pandemic: Cross-sectional analysis. *Journal of Medical Internet Research, 22*(9), e21490. doi:10.2196/21490

Sobel, M. R., Kim, S., & Riffe, D. (2020). The world at war: Three and a half decades of *New York Times* conflict coverage. *Media, War & Conflict, 13*(2), 170–187. doi:10.1177%2F1750635219828763

Stuart, A., & Zelizer, B. (Eds.). (2004). *Reporting war: Journalists in wartime*. London, UK: Routledge.

Sundar, S. S., & Limperos, A. M. (2013). Uses and grats 2.0: New gratifications for new media*. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 57*(4), 504–525. doi:10.1080/08838151.2013.845827

Tenenboim, O. (2017). Reporting war in 140 characters: How journalists used Twitter during the 2014 Gaza–Israel conflict. *International Journal of Communication, 11*, 3497–3518.

Wang, Z., & Tchernev, J. M. (2012). The "myth" of media multitasking: Reciprocal dynamics of media multitasking, personal needs, and gratifications. *Journal of Communication, 62*(3), 493–513. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01641.x

Weimann, G. (2006). *Terror on the Internet: The new arena, the new challenges*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press.

Weimann-Saks, D., Ariel, Y., & Elishar-Malka, V. (2019). Social second screen: WhatsApp and watching the World Cup. *Communication & Sport, 8*(1), 123–141. doi:10.1177%2F2167479518821913

White, M. (2020). The UK media report for war. *British Journalism Review, 31*(2), 13–16. doi:10.1177%2F0956474820931389

Wolfsfeld, G. (2004). *Media and the path to peace*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Wolfsfeld, G. (2018). The role of the media in violent conflicts in the digital age: Israeli and Palestinian leaders' perceptions. *Media, War & Conflict, 11*(1), 107–124. doi:10.1177%2F1750635217727312

Wolfsfeld, G., & Weimann, G. (1997). *Media and political conflict: News from the Middle East* (Vol. 10). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Yarchi, M. (2016). Does using "imagefare" as a state's strategy in asymmetric conflicts improve its foreign media coverage? The case of Israel. *Media, War & Conflict, 9*(3), 290–305. doi:10.1177%2F1750635215620826